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1 Introduction 
Heterogeneous phenomena are widely spread in our real world. Therefore, 
economists have been studied and considered as an important area of their 
research. Empirical studies also suggest that firms, which have different 
technologies, sizes, capacity, and strategies, and so on, compete in the same 
industry. The phenomenon arises even within a firm. For example, some 
employees are facing on strong incentives, while the others are provided with 
weak incentives. To our regret, such differences have been mainly taken as 
exogenous rather than endogenous variables in theoretical economics. So, this 
paper addresses this logical gap in a duopoly.  
This paper deals with a competition between two manufacturers within the 
Japanese subcontracting system. The Japanese subcontracting system is 
characterized by a cooperative relationship between the manufacturer and the 
supplier. In addition, the supplier's skill-and-ability plays a greatly important 
role in the manufacturer’s performance4.  
The result of this paper in the vein of earlier contributions that have sought to 
explain intraindustry heterogeneity of firms in environments where firms have 
identical opportunity sets. For instance, Mills (1990) demonstrates that 
heterogeneous plant sizes can emerge in equilibrium capacity expansion of a 
growing industry, even though scale economies give larger plants a unit cost 
advantage. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) examine the consequences of imperfectly 
                                                                          
4 See Asanuma (1985a, 1985b), Womack et al. (1990), Cusmano and Takeishi (1991), and 
Nishiguchi (1994) for the Japanese subcontracting system. They show the importance of a 
cooperative relationship between automakers and suppliers as well as of the suppliers’ 
skill-and-ability in the Japanese subcontracting system. In particular, the supplier’s 
skill-and-ability in this paper focuses on the cost reduction investment adopting prior to 
producing the intermediate. Each manufacturer provides its affiliated supplier with several 
supports to accumulate and upgrade the supplier’s skill-and-ability. We regard the 
manufacturer’s support as a pecuniary transfer, F, from the manufacturer to the supplier. 
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informed consumers in a ‘tourists and natives’ model, where some firms choose 
high prices and small scale by catering to the poorly informed consumer 
segment, while other firms choose low prices and large scale as they attract 
well-informed consumers. 
Under non convexity attributed to the moral hazard between principal and 
agent, the best response to other firms providing strong incentives can be to 
provide weak incentives (Hermalin, 1994). Under the cost tradeoff between the 
fixed cost and the variable cost, if their technology set is insufficiently convex, 
heterogeneous equilibrium is attainable (Mills and Smith, 1996)5. They also 
showed that uncertainty about demand or costs favors the emergence of 
heterogeneous firms. From the social welfare’s standpoint, equilibria tend to 
have too little heterogeneity. Gal-Or (1999) considered an oligopoly market 
competing with differentiated but competing products. If the demand between 
two products is moderately correlated, asymmetric equilibrium may arise; one 
firm establish its own sales force, while the other has its independent sales force. 
He also showed that vertical separation is more likely than vertical integration 
when their products are highly substitutable. 
This paper is summarized as follows; this paper shows that asymmetric 
equilibrium, in the sense that the intermediate goods (parts or component) 
prices paid from manufacturers to suppliers are different. The asymmetric 
equilibrium arises in the efficient environments of the cost reduction 
investment. Under the asymmetric equilibrium, a manufacturer setting a lower 
component price has a competitive advantage in duopoly. This paper also 
suggests two interesting results of a comparative analysis. One is that increase 
in demand makes the advantageous manufacturer, who sets the price of the 
intermediate to lower, reduce its Cournot equilibrium output, whereas it 
inspires the disadvantageous manufacturer to increase its Cournot equilibrium 
                                                                          
5 The model is similar to our model. The main difference between ours and theirs is that 
the technology set in our model is continuous, while their technology set has only two cases; 
high and low technology set. 
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output. The other is that the worse the cost condition becomes, the more output 
the advantageous manufacturer produces, while the less output the 
disadvantageous manufacturer does. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 
In section 3, it is shown that asymmetric equilibrium exists in a duopoly. 
Section 4 characterizes equilibria and deals with a comparative analysis. 
Concluding remarks are in Section 5.  
 
2 The Model 
Consider two manufacturers producing a homogeneous final product. The 
inverse demand function is specified as follows: 
 
p=a-b(qi+qj)                               (1) 
 
where p is the price of the final goods, a and b are positive constants,  and 
 are the output of each manufacturer.  
iq
jq
Each manufacturer purchases an intermediate for the final good from its own 
affiliated supplier. We assume that a procurement contract between them 
consists of a unit of the parts price w and a pecuniary transfer F. To put it 
precisely, when each manufacturer kA(k=i,j) offers the procurement contract to 
its supplier kS(k=i,j), it proposes the contract consisting of the intermediate 
price wk and the pecuniary transfer Fk6. For simplicity, we regard the pecuniary 
transfer as a lump-sum payment.  
A cost reduction investment takes place before the intermediate goods are 
produced in this model. The investment can decrease the marginal cost of the 
intermediate. For a complete explanation, suppose that the investment amount 
is xk. Then, the marginal cost becomes c-xk. The investment costs txk2/2 where t 
is a strictly positive constant. For simplicity, the cost of transforming the 
                                                                          
6 See Nariu et al. (2009) for details. 
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intermediate goods into the final goods is normalized to zero. We also assume 
that each unit of the final good requires exactly one unit of the intermediate 
goods.  
 For the conditions that the S.O.C is satisfied and all variables are non-negative, 
specifically, these assumptions take the following forms: 
 





a   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
A more detailed description of the timing of the three-stage game is given as 
follows: In stage 1, each manufacturer offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract7 to its 
Keiretsu supplier. In stage 2, each supplier determines its cost-reducing 
investment. Then, each manufacturer chooses his output level in stage 3. The 
payments and the intermediate goods are transferred between them according 
to the initial contract between stage 2 and stage 3. We focus on sub-game 
perfect equilibria for this game. 
 
3 The Analysis 
In the third stage, manufacturer iA chooses an output level for the final 
product in order to maximize its profit given the output of a rival firm. Then, 
firm iA’s maximization problem is: 
 
.;2,1,,...,))(( jijiqtrwFqwqqbaMax iiiijiiA      (2) 
 
where the subscript A denote the manufacturer. 
                                                                          
iw .iF
7 The manufacturer offers to its supplier a procurement contract which includes the price 
of an intermediate good  and a pecuniary transfer  
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From the first-order condition that ∂πiA/∂qi=a-2bqi-bqj-wi=0, the reaction 




The above two reaction functions yield the equilibrium outputs as solutions to 













                                           (3-2) 
 
The price for the final good and the manufacturers’ payoffs are obtained by 
















iA                         (4-2) 
 
What is important to note from Eq. (4-1) is that  
 
qi ⋚ qj  iff  wj ⋚wi 
 
Eq. (4-2) show how the marginal procurement cost wi affect their output levels. 
Concisely speaking, the higher firm iA’s marginal procurement cost wi is, the 
more firm jA’s output qj is, and vice versa. It is also worth noting from Eq. (3-1), 
Eq. (3-2) and Eq. (4-1) that  
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qi>0  ⇔  wi<(a+wj)/2  ⇔  p>wi 
qj>0  ⇔  wj<(a+wi)/2  ⇔  p>wj 
 
The above equations imply that the price for the final product is higher than the 
marginal procurement cost of each firm in order to have a positive output level.  
We turn then to the second stage game. In stage two, supplier iS makes an 
investment for reducing its marginal cost before the intermediate goods are 
produced. Therefore, supplier iS chooses the investment level xi in order to 










)2)(( 2              (5) 
 








                                 (6-1) 
 









The marginal cost and the payoff for supplier iS are obtained by substituting Eq. 
















ww          (3-6-3) 
 
From Eq. (6-1), the investment level xi of firm i is affected by firm j’s investment 
level xj positively, and vice versa. Concisely speaking, Eq. (6-1) implies that the 
higher the intermediate procurement price wi is, the less supplier iS's 
investment amount xi is, while the more supplier jS’s is, and vice verse.  
We now turn to the first stage game. Manufacturer iA chooses intermediate 
goods price wi and pecuniary transfer Fi to maximize its own profit given two 
constraint conditions that its supplier iS’s profit and intermediate goods price 






iA F and w    w.r.t.,F-9b
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iS       
 
Note that the first constraint condition is binding. Therefore, the Eq. (7) can be 
reduced as follows: 
 
0  w t.s.
















The first-order conditions8 is given by 
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 if wi=0. Therefore, 





   if  j2)w(bt2)a(bt6bct    (8-1) 
0)(ww ji                           if  j2)w(bt2)a(bt6bct    (8-2) 
 
It is also worth noting that if 02)a(bt6bct  , Eq. (8-2) should be satisfied for 
given . Therefore, the case corresponds to a corner solution: 0w j 
 




where the superscript O denotes corner solution. 
If, on the other hand, 02)a(bt6bct  , the reaction functions are obtained 















i   iff 2][bt  . 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2 shows the reaction curves in 1<bt<2 that support the various equilibria. 
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Note that the intersection of two reaction curves is a symmetric equilibrium but 
it is unstable. Two points, which corresponds to {0,(6bct-a(bt+2))/4(bt-1)} and 
{(6bct-a(bt+2))/4(bt-1), 0}, of the vertical and the horizontal axis support 
asymmetric equilibria. 
If bt>2, the equilibrium intermediate goods price is, therefore, the 







Figure 3-3 shows the reaction curves in bt>2 that support a symmetric 
equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium of {6bct-a(bt+2)}/(5bt-2) is stable. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Let us then see the case that bt=2. We know that two reaction curves are 
completely identical. Therefore, multi equilibria occur in this case.  
We turn to the case that 1<bt<2. If wi(wj)=0, wj≥{6bct-a(bt+2)}/(bt+2) 
should be satisfied. This lead to two asymmetric equilibria in the sense that each 
manufacturer set its intermediate goods price to be different: 
 
















We also obtain another equilibrium that two reaction curves, wi(wj) and wj(wi), 
intersect at wi=wj={6btc-a(bt+2)}/(5bt+2)9.  
Putting what we mentioned above together, when 1<bt<2, there exist three 
                                                                          
9 It is worth noting that if bt<2, {6btc-a(bt+2)}/4(bt-1)≥{6btc-a(bt+2)}/(bt+2). 
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However, it is worth noting that the symmetric equilibrium described by Eq. 
(3-10-1) is unstable in the interval that 1<bt<2.  
 
Proposition 1: Given Assumption 1 and Assumption 2,  
1. If , there exists a corner solution, wiO=wjO=0. 02)a(bt6bct 
2. If ,   02)a(bt6bct 
(a) There exists a symmetric equilibrium wi*=wj*={6bct-a(bt+2)}/(5bt-2) 
when bt>2. 
(b) There exist multi equilibria when bt=2.  













2)a(bt-6bct,0*)* w*,*(w ji .  
 
The regions that support asymmetric equilibria, 1<bt<2, means the efficient 
environments of the investment. To put it concisely, as b is the slope of demand 
curve and t is the efficiency parameter of the investment, the asymmetric 
equilibria are likely to happen when the slope of demand is gentle or the 
efficiency parameter of the investment is small.  
 
4 Comparative Analysis in Equilibria 
In the previous section, we illustrated that the asymmetric equilibria arise in 
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1<bt<2. To begin with, we analyze comparative statics in equibria.  
 
4.1 Corner Solution 
 As we explained in Proposition 1, if 02)a(bt6bct  , the equilibrium 
intermediate goods prices are wiO=wjO=0. Substituting them into Eq. (4-1), Eq. 
(4-2), Eq. (4-3), Eq. (6-1), Eq. (6-2), and Eq. (6-3), we obtain equilibrium 
investment amount, equilibrium marginal cost, equilibrium output amount, 





i                                               (11-1) 
a)/3bt3bct(cc Oj
O
i                                         (11-2) 
a/3bqq Oj
O
i                                                (11-3) 















                                          (11-6) 
 
  Now, we easily check that the optimal values of all variables obtained above 
are non-negative under Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and the condition for the 
corner solution which is 6bct<a(bt+2). From Assumption 2, in fact, it can be 
proved to be ciO=cjO>0. Note that (bt+2)<(2bt+1). Then, it is obvious that 
 from the condition that 6bct<a(bt+2). 0OjA
O
iA  
We now turn to the comparative statics. The parameter a shifts demand up 
and down. Increase in a demand (a) induces suppliers to make more 
investments. It also causes the price of the final goods to increase. More 
investments will induce manufacturers to produce more outputs and to gain 
more payoffs.  Suppose that the parameter of cost (c) shifts upward. The rise in 
the parameter of cost (c) will reduce their payoffs as a result of increments of 
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their pecuniary transfer. However, note that it does not directly affect 
equilibrium investment level, equilibrium output level, and price of final good.  
 
4.2 Symmetric Equilibrium 
Under the conditions that 6bct>a(bt+2) and bt>2, Cournot equilibrium 




                                  (12-1) 
 
Substituting it into Eq. (4-1), Eq. (4-2), Eq. (4-3), Eq. (6-1), Eq. (6-2), and Eq. 
(6-3), we have equilibrium investment level, equilibrium marginal production 
costs, equilibrium output amount, equilibrium final goods price, equilibrium 




                                       (12-2) 
25bt
2a5bct*c*c ji 
                                       (12-3) 
25bt
2c)2t(a*q*q ji 
                                      (12-4) 
25bt
4bct}a)2{(bt*p*p ji 










 ))(                               (12-7) 
 
Now, we can easily check that the optimal values of all variables obtained 
above are non-negative under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. Let us see the 
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effect of the demand parameter (a) on all the optimal variables. Increasing the 
demand parameter (a) will reduce the intermediate goods price and the 
marginal cost. If there is an increased demand for the final goods, each 
manufacturer will increase its output in order to acquire more profits. It induces 
each supplier to increase the cost reduction investment. The incremental 
investment results in decreasing in the marginal cost and the intermediate 
goods price. From the fact that ci*-wi*=bt(a-c)/(5bt-2)>0, each manufacturer 
sets the intermediate goods price to be lower than the marginal cost. Increasing 
the demand parameter (a) will increase output amount, investment level, and 
payoff.  
Next, suppose that the parameter of cost (c) shifts upward. It is also obvious 
that increase in cost parameter (c) will decrease output amount, investment 
level, and payoff. Furthermore, increasing the demand parameter (a) and the 
cost parameter (c) will rise up the final goods price.  
 
4.3 Asymmetric Equilibrium 
Under the conditions that 6bct>a(bt+2) and 1<bt<2, there exist two stable 
asymmetric equilibria. Substituting it into Eq. (4-1), Eq. (4-2), Eq. (4-3), Eq. 
(6-1), Eq. (6-2), and Eq. (6-3), In equilibrium, the intermediate goods price, the 
investment levels, the marginal production costs, the output amounts, the final 




                                      (13-1) 
0**w j                                                  (13-2) 
1)2(bt
c2a**xi 
                                           (13-3) 
1)4bt(bt
bt)a(22bct**x j 




                                            (13-5) 
1)4bt(bt
2bt)2bct(3bt)a(2**cj 
                                (13-6) 
1)2(bt
c)2t(a**qi 
                                            (13-7) 
1)4b(bt
bt)a(22bct**q j 
                                      (13-8) 
1)4(bt
bt)a(22bct**p 





                                         (13-10) 
22jA 1)t(bt32b
1)a}bt)(2bt(22bt)c5bt)a}{2bt((2{2bct** 





                                     (13-12) 
22j 1)t(bt32b
bt)a}(25)4btbt)a}{2bt((2{2bct**F 
                 (13-13) 
 
Now, we can easily check that all optimal variables obtained above are 
non-negative under Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and the condition for 
asymmetric equibria, 6bct>a(bt+2) 10 . When manufacturer jA sets the 
intermediate goods price to be zero and manufacturer iA sets it to be positive, 
the characteristics of the asymmetric equilibrium can be describe as follows. 
 
Proposition 2: Given 1<bt<2, 6bct>a(bt+2), Assumption 1, and Assumption 2, 
the asymmetric equilibria are characterized by; 
1. xj**>xi** 
2. qj**>qi** 
                                                                          
10 See Appendix for a detail. 
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3. ci**>wi** and cj**>wj**=0 
4. **** iAjA    
 
Proof)  
Under the conditions that 6btc>(bt+2)a and 1<bt<2, we have 
 
   xj**-xi**={6btc-(bt+2)a}/4bt(bt-1)>0                        (14-1) 
    qj**-qi**={6btc-(bt+2)a}/4b(bt-1)>0                        (14-2) 
ci**-wi**={bt(a-2c)+a}/4bt(bt-1)>011                        (14-3) 
 










iAjA        (14-4) 
 
In the end, manufacturer jA who sets the intermediate goods price to be 
zero enjoys more profit, output, and investment than those of manufacturer 
iA who sets the intermediate goods price to be positive12. 
Let us see the effect of some parameters on the asymmetric equilibria values. 
Suppose that the parameter of demand (a) shifts upward. Manufacturer iA with 
a positive intermediate goods price will increase its output amount through 
setting the intermediate goods price down. Increasing the output amount 
induces its supplier iS to make more aggressively in cost reduction investment. 
More investment not only will result in the marginal production cost to come 
                                                                          
11 It is obvious that cj**>wj**=0. 
12 Note that cj**<ci**. 
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down but also that manufacturer iA’s payoff to increase. Unlike manufacturer 
iA’s positive response to demand parameter’s increase, manufacturer jA with a 
zero intermediate goods price reduces its Cournot equilibrium output amount. 
Note that manufacturer iA and manufacturer jA are in Cournot competition by 
changing their intermediate goods prices. When demand increases, 
manufacturer jA can not decrease its intermediate goods price down because it 
already set a zero. Another important thing is that increase in demand 
parameter (a) decreases the price for final goods. 
 Secondly, let us see the effect of cost condition (c) on all variables. Suppose 
that cost condition (c) shifts upward. It will increase the intermediate goods 
price for manufacturer iA. Therefore, it will decrease Cournot equilibrium 
output amount for manufacturer iA. It will induce its supplier iS not only to 
decrease investment level but also to increase marginal production cost. In the 
end, the payoff for manufacturer iA will decrease. Unlike decreasing Cournot 
equilibrium output as manufacturer iA’s response to worse cost condition, 
manufacturer jA with a zero intermediate goods price will increase its Cournot 
equilibrium output level because it takes advantage position in Cournot 
competition with the rival firm iA. Increasing the output amount induces its 
supplier jS to make more aggressively in cost reduction investment. More 
investment will result in not only that the marginal production cost will come 
down but also that manufacturer jA’s payoff will increase. It is also interesting 
to have the positive effect of cost condition (c) on output of manufacturer jA. 
However, note that increasing the cost condition (c) will reduce the total output 
amounts and will increase the final goods price. 
Hybrid cars have various advantages over conventional vehicles, such as fuel 
efficiency, low cost per a mile, and environmental benefits. However, the hybrid 
cars also have disadvantage over the conventional automobiles. From the 
manufacturer’s point of view, it takes high cost for manufacturer to produce the 
hybrid cars. The same can be said for the luxury cars, such as Lexus which is the 
most expensive among the Japanese automobiles. In this case, our model 
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proposes that the advantageous firm produces more hybrid cars and more 
luxury cars than the disadvantageous firm produces.  
Let us see a more detailed economic phenomenon. From 2005 to 2008, 
Toyota’s market strategy is clearly different from Honda’s market strategy in the 
domestic passenger car market. Totally, the market size in the domestic market 
has been decreasing, especially plunged in 2008 by the global financial crisis 
caused by a collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage and the reversal of the 
housing boom. In the middle of decreasing the market size, the market share of 
the normal passenger car13 included the hybrid car, the luxury car, and no light 
car for Toyota has been increasing, while the market share of the light car for 
Toyota has been decreasing rapidly from 2005 to 2008. The reverse can be said 
for Honda. Figure 4 and Figure 5 sufficiently support the above phenomenon. 
 
[Figure 4 and 5 here] 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzed Cournot competition between homogeneous 
manufacturers with their own Keiretsu supplier. This paper dealt with a model 
in which a cost reduction investment took place before the intermediate goods 
was produced. We illustrated that asymmetric equilibrium arose in the sense 
that two manufacturers set their intermediate goods prices to be differently. It 
had been illustrated that the existence of asymmetric equilibrium by using 
trade-off relationship between fixed cost and variable cost (Mills and Smith, 
1996). Their technology choice is selected one of the alternatives. However, our 
asymmetric equilibrium is generated in the continuous technology set. They 
obtained this result with insufficiently convex technology set and random 
variable, while we achieved it with sufficiently convex component price set and 
continuous variable. 
                                                                          
13 The Japan Automobile Dealer Association classifies the passenger car into two 
categories; normal passenger car and light passenger car. 
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The affiliated relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier has been 
regarded as a hybrid organization between vertical integration and market. It 
has played a greatly important role in the rapid growth periods of the Japanese 
economy. So, this paper focused on a theoretical model linked with Keiretsu 
procurement. In the model, we illustrated that asymmetric equilibrium arose in 
the sense that the intermediate goods prices paid from manufacturers to 
suppliers was different. It seems to explain the performance differences between 
Japanese automakers in the domestic market. We also explained two interesting 
results to comparative static analysis. One was that the larger the demand 
becomes, the less output amount the advantageous manufacturer produces, 
while the more output amount the disadvantageous manufacturer produces. 
The other was that the worse the cost condition becomes, the more output the 
advantageous manufacturer produces, while the less output the 
disadvantageous manufacturer produces.  
 
Appendix 
It will be explained that all parameters of asymmetric equilibrium are 
non-negative, hereinafter, under the conditions that (1) 1<bt, (2) 2<a/c, (3) 
6bct>(bt+2)a, and (4) bt<2. It will be proved that a/c<2bt, to begin with, under 
the conditions (1) and (3). 0<2bt(bt-1) is satisfied under the condition (1). Let’s 
add 6bt to the equation and divide it into (bt+2). Rearranging it, we obtain 








6                                         (A-1) 
 
Secondly, it will be proved that a/c<2bt/(2-bt) is satisfied, under the conditions 
(1), (4), and (A-1). 1<bt<2 leads to (2-bt)<1. Rearranging and Multiplying it by 
2bt, we obtain 2bt<2bt/(2-bt). From Assumption 1 and 2bt<2bt/(2-bt), it is 









                                       (A-2) 
 
Thirdly, it will be proved that a/c>2bt(3-2bt)/(2-bt) is satisfied, under the 
conditions (1), (2). Suppose that x=bt and f(x)=a/c. Then, this leads to 













The function f(x) is decreasing function in the interval between 1<x<2. 
Therefore, the value of the function f(x) has 2, when x=1. From the condition (2), 









                                      (A-3) 
 
Lastly, it will be proved that all parameters, Eq. (13), of asymmetric equilibria 
are non-negative on the basis of these results. It is manifest that the component 
prices (wi**,wj**; wi**>0=wj**) are non-negative from the condition (3). Cost 
reduction investments (xi**,xj**; xj**>xi**>0) is non-negative from the 
conditions (1), (2), and Eq. (3-14-1). Marginal costs are non-negative from the 
conditions Eq. (A-1) and (A-2). Quantities (qi**,qj**; qj**>qi**>0) are apparent 
from the conditions (1), (2), and Eq. (14-2). The price of final good is 
non-negative under the condition Eq. (A-2). Manufacturers’ payoffs 
0 **** iAjA   are non-negative from the conditions (1), (2), and Eq. (14-1). 
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Figure 4. Market Shares for the Passenger Car
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